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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 10 1975 Number 4
THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE ISSUANCE OF
BARGAINING ORDERS IN THE ABSENCE OF
THE COMMISSION OF UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES: THE DEBATE GOES ON
Anthony R. Fasano*
The most common and clearly preferred method by which a union
secures recognition as the bargaining agent of an appropriately desig-
nated bargaining unit is by compliance with the procedure set down
in section 9(c) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
("LMRA") .1 This procedure anticipates the holding of an election by
the National Labor Relations Board in response to a petition having
been filed by the employees or any individual or labor organization act-
ing on their behalf, or by an employer who has been confronted with
a claim of representation from an individual or labor organization.2 It
had long been established, however, that majority status could be estab-
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., St.
John's University; M.A., Marquette University; J.D., LL.M., New York University.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
2. The Board has delegated to its regional directors its powers to determine the
appropriate bargaining unit, direct an election, and certify the results. Authority to take
such action is provided in section 153 of Title 29. In petitioning for an election, a labor
organization or individual seeking representation rights must show that at least thirty
percent of the employees in the bargaining init have indicated their support of such rep-
resentation. (See NLRB: STATEMENTS OF PlocEnDun, RurL.s AND REGuLTmONs §
101.18.) An employer, however, need only show that some labor organization has made
a claim to represent his employees in order to obtain a representation election.
1
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lished by means other than a secret ballot election. Section 9 of the
Wagner Act3 permitted the Board to resolve a question of representa-
tion by "a secret ballot of employees, or . . . any other suitable
method" of determining such status. Section 8(5) of the Wagner Act
established the employer's obligation to bargain "with the representa-
tives of his employees."4 An early court construction of the interrela-
tionship of these sections required the employer to bargain with the
union "as soon as the union presents convincing evidence of majority
support."'5 Although there was early acceptance of the principle of al-
ternative methods of establishing majority status, the Board and the
courts have strained to determine acceptable means by which such
status might be ascertained, and to devise remedies which permit the
reconciliation of a number of competing interests-the promotion of
collective bargaining, the exercise of an informed and uncoerced choice
by the employee, and employer free speech. The Supreme Court in
Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB' ("Linden Lumber")
had occasion to examine the circumstances under which a union's
representative status may be predicated on anything other than the
results of an election. Its conclusion significantly enhances the right
of an employer to refuse to accept evidence of majority status other
than the results of an election, and substantially narrows the utiliza-
tion of the bargaining order to initiate the collective bargaining rela-
tionship. It is the objective of this paper to examine the considerations
which prompted the Board's reevaluation of the threshold which ini-
tiates a bargaining obligation.
An examination of the language and legislative history of section
9(c) of the Wagner Act and sections 8(a)(5), 9(a), 9(c), 10(c) of
the LMRA provides insight into the preference of Congress for a secret
ballot election while recognizing the power of the Board to devise rem-
edies which effectuate the polices of the Act7 even though such reme-
dies are contrary to the preference for an election.
3. Wagner Act § 9(c), ch. 376, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended 29 U.s.C.
§ 159(c) (1970); see note 13 infra.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970); see note 14 infra.
5. NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757; 6 L.R.R.M. 746,
747 (2d Cir. 1940).
6. - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 429, 87 L.R.R.M. 3236 (1974).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1970) provides:
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full
flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and em-
ployers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful
procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights
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Section 9 (c) of the Wagner Act provided:
Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning
the representation of employees, the Board may investigate
such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the
name or names of the representatives that have been desig-
nated or selected. . . . In such an investigation, the Board
. . .may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize -any
other suitable method to ascertain such representatives.8
The phrase, "utilize any other suitable method" was interpreted by the
Board to endow it with authority to certify a union as the collective bar-
gaining representative when its majority status could be established by
a method other than an election,9 most often by the use of authorization
cards. 10 The Board not only designated a given individual as bargain-
ing agent, but it certified the union, thus giving it additional protec-
tion."1
The deletion of the phrase "or utilize any other suitable method"
from 9(c) in the Taft-Hartley amendments' 2 was intended to prohibit
the Board from issuing a certification in the absence of an election."3
It cannot be persuasively argued that the congressional intent in delet-
ing the phrase was to require that a union be certified before a refusal
8. Wagner Act § 9(c), ch. 372, § 9(c), 49- Stat. 449 (1935).
9. Gates Rubber Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 158, 4 L.R.R.M. 279 (1939); Santa Fe Trails
Transportation Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 767, 1 L.RR.M. 97 (1937); Armour & Co., 12 N.L.R.B.
49, 4 L.R.R.M. 123 (1939).
10. An authorization card states on its face that the signer authorizes the union to
act as its collective bargaining representative. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B.
1268, 54 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1964). If, on consideration of the totality of circumstances
surrounding the card solicitation, the signer is led to believe that he has merely au-
thorized an election rather than designated a bargaining representative, the card will not
be counted. If the signer is told that the card will bring about both of these ends, or
that it will be used solely to demonstrate that the solicitor is seeking status as the collec-
tive bargaining representative, it will be counted in ascertaining majority support.
N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 606-09, 71 L.R.R.M. 2481, 2493 (1969).
11. A Board certification establishes conclusive evidence of majority status for at
least one year from the date of certification. Although the one year insulation period
was established by statute in 1947 [29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3)] and is currently extended
only following a Board-conducted election, the Board, during the pre-Taft-Hartley pe-
riod, adopted informally a reasonable period rule following certification, usually one
year, during which the union was protected from raids from rival unions. Section 159
(c) (3) provides that "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdi-
vision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have
been held. . . ." This rule, following the 1947 amendments, would deny this protection
to a bargaining agent designated by the Board in a bargaining order rather than selected
by the employees in an election. Squirrel Brand Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 289, 32 L.R.R.M.
1022 (1953).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
13. If the Board finds... that such a question of representation exists, it shall di-
rect an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof. Id.
3
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to bargain by an employer is regarded as a violation of 8(a)(5).14  An
attempt by the House of Representatives to amend 8(a)(5) to pro-
duce this very result was ultimately rejected.' The House version
would have permitted an employer to refuse to recognize a union
clearly possessing majority support, but lacking certification by the
Board."0 Congress ultimately accepted the Senate version of the bill,
which retained the language of the original Wagner Act.17 Further-
more, section 9(a) which limits the employer's 8(a)(5) obligation
to bargain to "representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by a majority of the employees" in an approp-
riate unit gives no indication of the method to be used in selecting the
representative. Since Congress was aware of the Board practice of uti-
lizing authorization cards to trigger the employer's bargaining obliga-
tion,"" one may wonder why they did not terminate the practice. One
might argue that the Congress retained the practice so as to give the
Board a valuable weapon which it might use to effectuate its section
10(c) mandate to devise remedies to deal effectively with employer
violations of the rights of employees.' 9
14. Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), provides that it shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the represen-
tatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title."
Section 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such pur-
poses, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining ...
15. The House amendment of section 8(a) (5) reads as follows: "to refuse to bar-
gain collectively with the representatives of his employees currently recognized by the
employer or certified as such under section 9." H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947);
1 LEG sATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEmENT RELATIONS Acr 178 (1947).
16. "The present section 8(5) requires an employer to bargain 'subject to the provi-
sions of section 9(a),' which provides that a representative chosen by the majority of
the employees in a bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of all the employees
in the unit. The bill imposes the obligation to bargain upon the employer if the union
is 'currently recognized by the employer or certified as such (exclusive representative)
under section 9.' Under this language, if an employer is satisfied that a union represents
the majority and wishes to recognize it without its being certified under section 9, he
is free to do so as long as he wishes, but as long as he recognizes it, or when it has
been certified, he must bargain with it. If he wishes not to recognize an uncertified
union, or, having recognized it, stops doing so, the union may ask the Board to certify
it under section 9." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1947); 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TE LAB oR-MANAGEMENT RmLATIONS Acr 321 (1947).
17. See note 14 supra.
18. See note 9' supra.
19. Section 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970) provides:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of
the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is en-
gaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board .. . shall issue and
cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action...
as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter. ...
4
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Some consideration must be given to section 9(c)(1)b) which
provides that an employer may petition for an election whenever one
or more unions present demands for recognition. It can be argued that
this section is inconsistent with the issuance of bargaining orders in that
it extends to the employer the right to petition for an election whenever
a question concerning representation exists. Such an argument ignores
the congressional purpose in enacting the provision. Under the Wag-
ner Act the employer could petition for an election only when con-
fronted with petitions from two unions. Section 9(c)(1)(8) was in-
tended to deal with this injustice and to prevent an employer petition
for an election during the initial stages of an organizational campaign
before the union has had an adequate opportunity to secure majority
support.20
A reading of the legislative history shows that while Congress re-
cognized the preferred status of the election process for the purpose
of initiating the obligation to bargain, it recognized the existence of al-
ternative methods, and indicated no desire to abolish them. Having
so concluded, one still knows little either of the desirability of issuing
bargaining orders or the circumstances under which such orders have
Although the authority of the Board to determine the manner in which inappropri-
ate employer or union action may be remedied is considerable, it is not without limit.
"The power to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive." Republic Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12, 7 LR.R.M. 287, 290 (1940). The bargaining order,
that is, an order directed to the employer to bargain with the union in the absence of
an election, can be justified as remedial even though its primary purpose is to serve as
a deterrent. The order is remedial in that a union's majority support, as manifested by
authorization cards, has been dissipated by unlawful employer conduct, and the order
brings about an end that would have come about had it not been for the employer. If
there is a flaw in this reasoning, the employer must tolerate it since his illegal action
was responsible for the atmosphere that made "an unfettered free choice" by the employ-
ees improbable.
20. "The present Board rules also discriminate against employers who have reason-
able grounds for believing that labor organizations claiming to represent their employees
are really not the choice of the majority. It is true that where an employer is confronted
with conflicting claims by two or more labor organizations, he may file a petition. But
where only one union is in the picture, the Board denies him this right. Consequently,
even though a union which has the right to petition and be certified as the majority rep-
resentative, if it is really such, may strike for recognition, an employer has no recourse
to the Board for settlement of such disputes by the peaceful procedures provided for by
the Act. The one-sided character of the Board's rules has been defended on the ground
that if an employer would petition at any time, he could effectively frustrate the desire
of his employees to organize by asking for an election on the first day that a union or-
ganizer distributed leaflets at his plant. It should be noted that this may be a valid argu-
ment for placing some limitation upon an employer's right to petition, but it is no justi-
fication for denying it entirely. The committee has recognized this argument insofar
as it has point, by giving employers a right to file a petition but not until a union has
actually claimed a majority or demanded exclusive recognition." S. REP. No. 105 on
S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1947).
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been issued and ought to be issued in the future. It is necessary to
examine the legal background of the bargaining order prior to the Lin-
den Lumber case so that one can more completely understand the
Court's motive in departing, if it did so depart, from its earlier ap-
proach.
Soon after the passage of the Wagner Act, in recognition of the
damaging impact of an employer refusal to bargain on an employee's
right to organize, the Board implemented section 9(c) of the Act 21 by
issuing bargaining orders to deter an employer from engaging in con-
duct that undermined the union's majority status without any injury as
to the existence of less severe remedies which possessed the same de-
terrent effect but minimized the potential for abuse that authorization
cards have on employee free choice.22 That the deterrent effect was
the predominate motive in issuing the bargaining order is clearly dem-
onstrated in Franks Bros. v. NLRB23 where the Supreme Court af-
firmed the issuance of a bargaining order commenting that:
Out of its wide experience, the Board many times has ex-
pressed the view that an unlawful refusal of an employer to
bargain collectively with its employees' chosen representa-
tives disrupts the employees' morale, deters organizational
activities, and discourages their membership in unions. The
Board's study of this problem has led it to conclude that, for
these reasons, a requirement that union membership be kept
intact during delays incident to hearings would result in per-
mitting employers to profit from their own wrongful refusal
to bargain. 4
The Court went on to note:
The Board might well think that, were it not to adopt this
type of remedy, but instead order elections upon every claim
that a shift in union membership had occurred during pro-
ceedings occasioned by an employer's wrongful refusal to bar-
gain, recalcitrant employers might be able by continued op-
position to union membership indefinitely to postpone per-
formance of their statutory obligation.25
Thus, prior to the adoption of the Taft-Hartley amendments in
1947, it was a well established principle that a union's status as a bar-
21. See note 8 supra.
22. See Armour and Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 49, 4 L.R.R.M. 123 (1939); Gates Rubber
Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 158, 4 L.R.R.M. 279 (1939); Inland Steel Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 783, 3
L.R.R.M. 331 (1938); N.L.R.B. v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512, 9 L.R.R.M. 410
(1942).
23. 321 U.S. 702, 14 L.R.R.M. 591 (1944).
24. Id. at 592-93, 704.
25. Id. at 593, 705.
[Vol. 10:507
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gaining representative might be established by a means other than an
election even though the union's majority at the time of the issuance
of the bargaining order had been dissipated by unlawful employer con-
duct. Secondly, the cases make clear that the unlawful conduct com-
plained of may consist solely of a refusal to bargain by an employer
with no requirement of his having taken any other affirmative action.2 6
The Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947, as noted earlier, merely indi-
cated a preference for the election process as a means of determining
majority status, but did not elevate the election process to a position
of sole determinant of majority status. Thereafter, certification by the
Board would follow only a section 9(c) election, but certification was
not a condition of recognition.
The Board in Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB ("Joy Silk")2 7 ex-
panded its earlier approach in fashioning a "good faith doubt" test fo-
cusing on the employer's state of mind in determining the appropriate-
ness of a bargaining order following an employer refusal to bargain.
In finding an 8(a)(5) violation, the Court stated that:
[Ain employer may refuse recognition of a union when
motivated by a good faith doubt as to that union's majority
status. When, however, such refusal is due to a desire to
gain time and to take action to dissipate the union's majority,
the refusal is no longer justifiable and constitutes a violation
of the duty to bargain set forth in section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.28
The difficulty created by the decision, apart from the obvious problem
of probing into the mind of the employer to determine the existence
of the doubt, was whether the Board would require the employer to
26. See Armour and Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 49, 4 L.R.R.M. 123 (1939); Vanadium Corp.
of America, 13 N.L.R.B. 836, 4 L.R.R.M. 361 (1939).
In the overwhelming majority of decisions, the courts have regarded it as essential
that the union possessed a majority at some point prior to the issuance of the bargaining
order. There are few decisions which have held that a bargaining order may be issued
in the absence of the union ever establishing majority support where the "employer's un-
fair labor practices are so outrageous and pervasive and of such a nature that their co-
ercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with the
result that a fair and reliable election cannot be had." NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing
Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570, 66 L.R.R.M. 2596, 2603 (4th Cir. 1967); see also J.P. Stevens
& Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514, 76 L.R.R.M. 2817 (5th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court
in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 71 L.R.R.M. 2481 (1969), indicated its
awareness of this practice, but did not indicate its acceptance of it. The Court limited
its holding to permitting the issuance of a bargaining order only where the employer
has committed unfair labor practices which have undermined the majority support held
at some point by the union, and where the likelihood of a fair election is slight.
27. 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), enforcing 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 24 L.R.R.M. 1548
(1949).
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take any affirmative action in order to assert a "good faith doubt." This
becomes especially relevant when the employer has engaged in no con-
duct undermining the union's majority.
Although the decision contained language which would permit the
Board to determine good faith by focusing on the existence of a doubt
when the employer is presented with a request for recognition as well
as on employer conduct subsequent to the request to bargain designed
to undermine union support, 29 the case was largely disposed of on the
basis of the commission of unfair labor practices. Subsequent courts
which later adopted the Joy Silk rationale30 converted subsequent em-
ployee conduct into an almost conclusive presumption of bad faith. It
is unfortunate that the courts established, in so casual a manner, a con-
nection between the commission of unfair labor practices by an em-
ployer, and the lack of good faith as to the union's majority,"' since
the unfair labor practices were as consistent with a desire to prevent
the union from securing a majority as with a desire to destroy a majority
already attained. 2 Attention is more appropriately directed to the
likelihood of a fair election as a result of the unfair labor practice. This
is in keeping with the avoidance of drastic remedies, which may deter
employers from engaging in unlawful activity, but which generate po-
tentially adverse effects on employees' section 7 rights.83 Conceding
that an employer's unfair labor practices might reduce a union's ma-
jority as evidenced in authorization cards does not insure that the cards
29. "In cases of this type the question of whether the employer is acting in good
or bad faith at the time of the refusal is, of course, one which of necessity must be deter-
mined in the light of all relevant facts in the case, including any unlawful conduct of
the employer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the refusal and the
unlawful conduct." 185 F.2d at 742, 27 L.R.R.M. at 2019.
30. The decision was adopted by every circuit. NLRB v. Whitelight Prods. Div.,
298 F.2d 12, 49 L.R.R.M. 2402 (lst Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Pyne Molding Corp., 226
F.2d 818, 37 L.R.R.M. 2007 (2d Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Epstein, 203 F.2d 482, 43
L.R.R.M. 1426 (3d Cir. 1953); Bilton Insulation Inc., v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 141, 49
L.R.R.M. 2267 (4th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Stewart Oil Co., 207 F.2d 8, 32 L.R.R.M.
2651 (5th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Armco Drainage & Metal Prods., Inc., 220 F.2d 573,
35 L.R.R.M. 2536 (6th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Jackson Press, Inc., 201 F.2d 541, 31
L.R.R.M. 2315 (7th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Decker, 296 F.2d 338, 49 L.R.R.M. 2107 (8th
Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Trimfit of California, Inc., 211 F.2d 206, 33 LR.R.M. 2705 (9th
Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Hamilton Co., 220 F.2d 492, 35 L.R.R.M. 2658 (10th Cir. 1955).
31. See Swan Super Cleaners, 152 N.L.R.B. 163, 59 L.R.R.M. 1054 (1965); Frantz
and Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1322, 59 L.R.R.M. 1645 (1965); Comfort, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B.
1074, 59 L.R.R.M. 1260 (1965).
32. NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 65 L.R.R.M. 2987 (2d Cir. 1967).
33. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing,. . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities....
Labor-Management Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
[Vol. 10:507
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reflect the desire of the employees to select the union as its collective
bargaining representative.
The opportunity for coercion by union organizers is enhanced
when an authorization card is used rather than an election. So, too,
is the likelihood that employees will misunderstand the significance of
the authorization.34 It may be argued that, even in the absence of un-
lawful employer conduct, a union which has authorization cards signed
by a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit may lose the elec-
tion. 3 Congress having indicated that the election process is the pre-
ferred method of initiating a bargaining obligation since it is most likely
to balance a variety of interests that need to be encouraged,36 it would
seem desirable to utilize a less severe remedy, if one exists, which pro-
motes those same interests but minimi es the potential for abuse.
The Board in Hammond & Irving Inc. ("Hammond")37 stated the
Joy Silk rule ought not to operate as a per se rule, conclusively estab-
lishing the bad faith of the employer. More significant is the Board
statement that "not every act of misconduct necessarily vitiates the re-
spondent's good faith." ' The Board recognized that some unfair labor
practices are not inconsistent with a good faith doubt that a union rep-
resents the majority of the employees. The Board, the following year,
handed down its decision in Aaron Brothers Co. ("Aaron").39 Here the
burden of proving the employer's bad faith was shifted to the Board.
The Board reiterated its statement in Hammond that the commission
of an unfair labor practice did not per se establish bad faith, and indi-
cated that what was required was the commission of "substantial unfair
labor practices calculated to dissipate union support." 40  The Ham-
34. Increased sensitivity to this problem ought to be stimulated by the Supreme
Court's decision in the Gissel case noting that "employees should be bound by the clear
language of what they sign unless that language is deliberately and clearly canceled by
a union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget the
language above his signature." 395 U.S. at 606, 71 L.R.PM. at 2493.
35. In an address to the American Bar Association, former NLRB chairman McCul-
lock stated:
In 58 elections, the unions presented authorization cards from 30 to 50
percent of the employees; and they won 11 or 19 percent of them. In 87 elec-
tions, the unions presented authorization cards from 50 to 70 percent of the
employees; and they won 42 to 52 percent of them. In 57 elections, the unions
presented authorization cards from over 70 percent of the employees; and they
won 43 or 74 percent of them.
1962 PRocEEDINGs, ABA LABOR REATioNS L w SEcTiON, cited in NLRB v. Johnnie's
Poultry Co., 344 F.2d 617, 620, 59 L.R.R.M. 2117, 2120 (8th Cir. 1965).
36. Those interests are: the promotion of collective bargaining, employer free
speech, an uncoerced and informed choice of a bargaining representative.
37. 154 N.L.R.B. 1071, 60 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1965).
38. 154 N.L.R.B. at 1073, 60 L.R.R.M. at 1074.
39. 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 62 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1966).
40. 158 N.L.R.B. at 1079, 62 L.R.R.M. at 1161.
The Board in Aaron Brothers argued that the Yoy Silk rule conformed to the utiliz-
1975]
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inond and Aaron cases moved the Board closer to its ultimate rejection
of the good faith test. The employer no longer had to state his desire
for an election or show any ground for doubt when asked for recogni-
tion. He could simply indicate that he desired an election, and in the
absence of the commission of substantial unfair labor practices which
undermined the support of the union, a showing that he possessed in-
dependent knowledge of the union's majority status, or a refusal to
bargain on grounds other than a doubt as to the union's majority status,
there would be no finding of bad faith. The discussion of the last
two concepts will enable us to deal with the first category of decisions
which Joy Silk permitted the Board to reach, those cases where the
employer is held to have acted inappropriately at the time a request
to bargain is made. If an employer either possesses independent
knowledge or if his refusal is based on something other than doubt
about the union's majority status, there is a presumption of bad
faith resulting in a violation of 8(a) (5). Thus far, we have been deal-
ing with the commission of unfair labor practices, violations of 8(a)(1),
8(a)(2), 8(a)(3), 8(a)(4), from which the Board has concluded the
absence of good faith. The Board noted in the Aaron decision that
the employer's bad faith could be established by conduct which did not
constitute an unfair labor practice.41
The independent knowledge doctrine was developed in Snow &
Sons v. NLRB ("Snow & Sons")42 and provides that an employer may
be ordered to bargain with a union on the basis of authorization cards,
even though he has committed no unfair labor practices independent
of 8(a)(5), if he has independent knowledge of a union's majority
status. In Snow & Sons, the employer agreed to submit the authoriza-
tion cards to an impartial third party for authentication. The employer,
ing of the most reliable means available to determine the desires of the employees.
Where an employer has engaged in unfair labor practices, the results of a
Board-conducted election are a less reliable indication of the true desires of em-
ployees than authorization cards, whereas, in a situation free of such unlawful
interference, the converse is true.
158 N.L.R.B. at 1079 n.10, 62 L.R.R.M. at 1161 n.10. Thus the Board established as
a primary objective the implementation of the will of the majority of the employees, and
the avoidance of remedies whose sole purpose is deterrence where more "reliable means"
are available. The Board is, in this manner, able to utilize the bargaining order when
necessary while avoiding the charge that the order is penal in nature, rather than reme-
dial, and thus in excess of the Board's authority. The remedial nature of the order is
established by arguing that it is the best method of determining the majority will since
the employer's coercive conduct has made any other method unreliable.
41. 158 N.L.R.B. at 1079, 62 L.R.R.M. at 1161.
42. 308 F.2d 687, 51 L.R.R.M. 2199 (9th Cir. 1962), enforcing 134 N.L.R.B. 709,
49 L.R.RM. 1228 (1961).
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however, reneged on his agreement and refused to recognize the union
after the third party indicated that the cards reflected the desire of the
majority of the employees to designate the union as their collective bar-
gaining representative. The Board held if an employer agrees to sub-
mit authorization cards to an impartial third party for verification and
the cards have been so authenticated, the employer will be held to an
8(a)(5) violation in the event he refuses to bargain.43 The Snow &
Sons decision appears to have been limited to its facts44 prior to the
decision of the Board in Pacific Abrasive Supply Co.45 In Strydel, Inc.,
the Board indicated that it was unwilling to infer that:
[Riespondent was guilty of bad faith merely because it denied
recognition while rejecting the Union's proposal for sub-
mission of the cards to impartial determination. This does
not, standing alone, provide an independent basis for con-
cluding that the instant denial of recognition was unlawful. 46
The Supreme Court indicated its awareness of the Board's inde-
pendent knowledge doctrine in Gissel Packing Co. ("Gissel") 47
but chose to avoid any extensive consideration of it since it was not nec-
essary to the disposition of the case, there being present the commis-
sion of "pervasive" employer unfair labor practices which made a fair
43. Kellog Mills, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 342, 56 L.R.R.M. 1223 (1964); enforced, 347
F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1965); Dixon Ford Shoe Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 861, 58 L.LR.M. 1160
(1955).
44. See Strydel, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1185, 61 L.R.R.M. 1230 (1966); Furr's, Inc.,
157 N.L.R.B. 387, 61 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1966); enforced, 381 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
45. 182 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.1LR._M. 1113 (1970).
46. 61 L.R.R.M. at 1230 (1966) .
47. 395 U.S. 575, 71 L.R.R.M. 2481 (1969).
When confronted by a recognition demand based on possession of cards alleg-
edly signed by a majority of his employees, an employer need not grant recog-
nition immediately, but may, unless he has knowledge independently of the
cards that the union has a majority, decline the union's request and insist on
an election.
395 U.S. at 591, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2487. The Court, however, indicated that it need not
deal with the question in the case before it since the Court in Gissel had the advantage
of employer unfair labor practices which made a fair election improbable.
We thus need not decide whether, absent election interference by an employer's
unfair labor practices, he may obtain an election only if he petitions for one
himself; whether, if he does not, he must bargain with a card majority if the
Union chooses not to seek an election; and whether, in the latter situation, he
is bound by the Board's ultimate determination of the card results regardless
of his earlier good faith doubts, or whether he can still insist on a Union-
sought election if he makes an affirmative showing of his positive reasons for
believing that there is a representation dispute.
395 U.S. at 601 n.18, 71 L.R.R.M. 2491 n.18. It did, however, cite with approval its
earlier decision in United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62,
72 n.8, 37 L.R.R.M. 2828, 2831 n.8 (1956) which noted that a "Board election is not
the only method by which an employer may satisfy itself as to the union's majority
status." 395 U.S. at 597,71 L.R.R.M. at 2489.
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election improbable. The Court, however, did note the permissible is-
suance of a bargaining order where no unfair labor practices, independ-
ent of a violation of 8(a)(5), had been committed. It indicated the
continuing validity of its earlier comment in United Mine Workers v.
Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. ("Arkansas Oak Flooring") that "in the ab-
sence of any bona fide dispute as to the existence of the required ma-
jority of eligible employees, the employer's denial of recognition of the
union would have violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act."48
The Supreme Court in Gissel noted that the Board, in it oral argu-
ment, had abandoned the Joy Silk doctirine.4 9 Both the Court and the
Board, however, seem to have left unclear the extent of the abandon-
ment.,
The Joy Silk approach permitted the Board to focus on conduct
taking place both before and after the employer refusal to bargain. An
employer's refusal to bargain could be found to constitute bad faith if
it could be established either that at the time the employer refused to
bargain he could have had no good faith doubt about the union's ma-
jority, or that unfair labor practices committed following this refusal to
bargain dissipated the support of the employees for the union. 0 In
abandoning Joy Silk, the Board clearly was not repudiating the second
half of the test. The Board indicated in Gissel that "the commission
of serious unfair labor practices that interferes with the election proc-
esses and tends to preclude the holding of a fair election" shall con-
tinue to merit the issuance of a bargaining order.51 As to the first half
of the Joy Silk test relating to the appropriateness of a refusal to bar-
gain, the Board retained the "independent knowledge" doctrine, and
acknowledged its expansion to reach the employer whose polling 2 of
his employees established the union's majority support. 8 The Board
48. 351 U.S. 62, 72 n.8, 37 L.R.R.M. 2828, 2831 n.8 (1956).
49. 395 U.S. at 594, 71 LLR.M. at 2488.
50. 185 F.2d 732, 742,27 L.R.M. 2012, 2019 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
51. 395 U.S. at 594, 71 L.R.RLM. at 2488.
52. 395 U.S. at 594-95, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2488. In Strucksnes Construction Co.
Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1386 (1967), the Board listed the
safeguards which must be followed by an employer who takes a poll of his employees:
(1) the purpose of the poll must be to determine the truth of the union's claim of ma-
jority support, (2) this purpose must be communicated to the employees, (3) the em-
ployer must provide assurances against any reprisal in the future, (4) there must be a
poll by secret ballot, (5) the employer must not have engaged in unfair labor practices
or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere.
53. In NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., 386 F.2d 551, 66 L.R.R.M. 2603 (4th Cir.
1967), the court held that in the event that the results of an employer's poll of the em-
ployees confirms the union's claim of majority support, the employer may not assert the
lack of good faith doubt regarding such status unless he can assert some specific basis
[Vol. 10:507
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also noted that refusals of recognition premised on arguments not rele-
vant to the union's majority would result in an 8(a)(5) violation."
Therefore the Board had narrowed Joy Silk by permitting the employer
to refuse to bargain so long as he avoided engaging in unlawful activity
making a fair election improbable, and so long as he possessed no in-
dependent information as to the union's majority. The degree of ,the
Board's limitation of Joy Silk would depend on its subsequent construc-
tion of the breadth of "independent knowledge."
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Gissel generated consider-
able uncertainty as to the limitations it was placing on Joy Silk. Be-
cause of the commission of extensive unfair labor practices designed
to undermine the union's majority, the Court indicated: "[W]e need
not decide whether a bargaining order is ever appropriate in cases
where there is no interference with the election processes."'5 5 The
Court noted without comment the Board's carving out of exceptions
from its "abandonment" of Joy Silk. 6 The Court clearly accepted the
appropriateness of the issuance of a bargaining order when the em-
ployer engaged in unfair labor practices designed to erode the union's
majority when "the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices
and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional
remedies, though present, is slight." 57  The intent underlying the order
for doing so. This admittedly places the employer in an awkward position in that, if
he seeks to inform himself as to the validity of the cards, he is bound by the confirma-
tion. This would appear to encourage his taking no action, and simply requesting the
union to go to an election. In that event, unless the Board can establish independent
knowledge of the union's majority, the commission of unfair labor practices which make
a fair election improbable, or an assertion by the employer of doubt as to the union's
majority based on factors unrelated to its majority, the action is likely to be sustained.
A brief comment concerning the assertion of doubt by the employer on the basis
of some factor unrelated to the union's majority is in order. In Florence Printing Co.
v. NLRB, 145 N.L.R.B. 141, 54 L.R.R.M. 1325 (1963), the Board held that a good faith
but erroneous belief that the unit requested by a union is inappropriate may not be as-
serted as a defense to an 8(a) (5) charge. An employer who relies on a doubt of appro-
priateness of a unit in refusing to bargain does so at his peril. The Florence decision
also indicates that such a doubt, where permitted, must be relied upon at the time of
the request for and refusal to bargain. The Board will also not tolerate the following
as defenses to an 8(a) (5) charge: (1) an erroneous view of the law, Old King Cole,
Inc. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 530, 43 L.R.R.M. 2059 (1958); (2) lack of Board jurisdiction
on the basis of a belief that the employer was not engaged in commerce as defined under
the Act, H & W Construction Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 852, 63 L.R.R.M. 1346 (1966); (3)
belief that its employees were independent contractors, NLRB v. Keystone Floors, Inc.,
306 F.2d 560, 50 L.R-R.M. 2699 (3d Cir. 1962).
54. 395 U.S. at 595, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2488.
55. Id.
56. 395 U.S. at 594-95, 71 L.LR.M. at 2488.
57. 395 U.S. at 614, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2496.
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is not simply to penalize the employer for having engaged in unlawful
activity, and to prevent him from benefitting from his illegal conduct.
The order is an acknowledgement that a fair election is no longer likely
and that the "most reliable means" of determining the desire of the
employees is by examination of the authorization cards. 58 The cards,
while admittedly an imperfect reflection of the will of the majority, are
the best method available to effectuate the section 7 rights of the em-
ployees.
Considerably more difficult is a determination of the Court's view
concerning the parameters of Board authority where the only unfair
labor practice committed by the employer is the refusal to bargain itself.
The Court recognized that a Board-conducted election is not the sole
method of initiating a bargaining obligation. Since the Court limited
its discussion to activity involving employer unfair labor practices other
than the mere refusal to bargain, it must have impliedly conceded some
other method of bringing into being the bargaining obligation. The
Court cited approvingly its earlier decision in Arkansas Oak Flooring
where the Court stated that once authorization cards signed by the
majority of employees in a bargaining unit were submitted, "[i]n the
absence of any bona fide dispute as to the existence of the required.
majority of eligible employees, the employer's denial of recognition of
the union would have violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act."60 Con-
sequently, it may be argued that, despite the Court's failure to comment
on the exceptions to Joy Silk carved out by the Board in Gissel, it re-
garded the exceptions, at least in so far as they were stated, as permis-
sible.
The Board extended the scope of the "independent knowledge
doctrine" in Pacific Abrasive Supply Co. ("Pacific Abrasive")"' Union
organizers presented the employer with authorization cards signed by
four employees in a warehouse unit.62 The employer, upon presenta-
tion of the cards, acknowledged their authenticity. The employer was
told the next day by four employees of their support of the union.
When the employer refused to bargain with the union, the four
employees decided to strike and commenced picketing soon thereafter.
58. Id.
59. 395 U.S. at 597, 71 L.PR.M. at 2489.
60. 395 U.S. at 597-98, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2489.
61. 182 N.L.R.B. 329, 74L.R.R.M. 1113 (1970).
62. The Trial Examiner found the bargaining unit to be an appropriate one.
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Concluding that these facts "established independent knowledge!', "
the Board found that the employer violated 8(a)(5), and a bargaining
order was issued. The opinion does not imply that the mere presenta-
tion of cards signed by a majority of the employees triggers a bargain-
ing obligation. But the presentation and verification of their authen-
ticity by the employer established the "absence of a dispute concerning
representation" at the time of the refusal to bargain.
The Board extended the doctrine still further in Wilder Manu-
facturing Co., Inc. ("Wilder ").64 In that case, the employer was
presented with eleven signed authorization cards and two unsigned
cards"5 along with a request to recognize the union as bargaining
representative of the eighteen employees in the production and
maintenance unit. Unable to get an immediate answer on the request
to bargain, the eleven employees left the plant and set up a picket line.
They were joined the following day by the two employees who had sub-
mitted unsigned cards. The Board indicated that the mere presenta-
tion of cards signed by a majority of the employees was insufficient to
establish a bargaining obligation. The Board concluded that an em-
ployer's refusal to bargain violated section 8(a)(5) and that a bargain-
ing order was an appropriate remedy when the record contains:
(1) evidence in addition to mere cards sufficient to com-
municate to the employer convincing knowledge of majority
status, and (2) insufficient evidence that the employer's re-
fusal to grant recognition was based upon a genuine willing-
ness to resolve any doubts concerning majority status through
the Board's election processes.66
The Board concluded that the combination of the cards, the strike in
which all who signed cards participated, and the fact that an officer of
the employer conceded that he told his fellow officers that the union
had the support of "ten or eleven' of the employees, was sufficient to
support a finding that the employer had independent knowledge of the
union's majority. 7 The Board noted that there was no evidence in the
record of any employer attempt to resolve "any lingering doubts" con-
cerning the majority status of the union by petitioning for an election,
or suggesting that the union so petition. The opinion merits some
63. 182 N.L.R.B. at 330, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1115.
64. 185 N.L.R.B. 176, 75 L.R.R.M. 1023 (1970).
65. Two blank cards were included because two employees indicated their desire to
sign, but the union had not as yet obtained the signature.
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examination because of its casual acceptance of some questionable
assumptions.
The weaknesses inherent in authorization cards as a valid barome-
ter of employee wishes have already been noted. 8 The Board's con-
clusion that refusal to cross a picket line is strongly indicative of support
fails to consider the impact of fear and peer pressure as motivating in-
fluences.' 9 It seems unfair that the Board would find persuasive an
inadvertent remark as to the degree of union support made by one offi-
cer of the employer to another officer, particularly in the absence of
any demonstration that the comment was based on anything other than
hearsay. Finally, the Board seems to require that the employer take
some affirmative action to establish the reasonableness of his doubt of
the union's majority. It had long been established that an employer
need take no action whatever when confronted with a request to bar-
gain.70 The burden is on the Board to establish the commission of un-
fair labor practices or the possession of independent knowledge of the
union's majority."1 That burden becomes proportionately easier to
bear as the degree of employer action increases.72
In Redmond Plastics, Inc.,7 the employer was presented with
authorization cards from sixteen of the twenty-one employees in a bar-
gaining unit together with a request to bargain. The union, in order
to maximize the impact of the authorization cards, informed the
employer that twelve employees did not go to work but remained out-
side the plant, and that additional employees would join them in the
event the employer required further proof of support. The employer
indicated his belief that the union did, indeed, possess such a majority,
that he would recognize the union, and that negotiations would begin
toward the drafting of a contract in three days."4  The employer com-
mitted to writing the substance of what had taken place along with his
recognition of the union, but refused to sign it until he talked with
counsel. Later on that day, the employer informed the union that he
would agree only to a consent election. The Board issued an order
68. See note 34 supra.
69. See NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56, 76 L.R.R.M. 2181, 2183
(4th Cir. 1971); Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1110 n.44, 84
L.R.R.M. 2177, 2185 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
70. See notes 47 and 53 supra.
71. John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 79 (1965); Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B.
1077 (1966).
72. See note 53 supra.
73. 187 N.L.R.B. 487, 76 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1970).
74. 187 N.L.R.B. at 487-88, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1035-36.
[Vol. 10:507
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 10 [1974], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss4/2
BARGAINING ORDERS
to bargain finding that the employer's subsequent assertion of doubt of
the union's majority was "clearly contrived and wholly specious. ' 75
The Board concluded that the employer's insistence on the utilization
of the election process was motivated by a desire to delay the imple-
mentation of his bargaining obligation.
The Board begain its retreat from the positions taken in Pacific
Abrasive and Wilder I when it decided Linden Lumber Division,
Summer & Co. ("Summer & Co.")76  The employer, when presented
with cards signed by twelve employees in a twelve-man unit, refused
to bargain on the ground that since two of the members of the unit
were supervisors, 77 employer recognition would constitute a violation
of section 8(a)(2).78 The employer rejected the union's submission
of a new petition containing a "fresh" showing of interest by thirty per-
cent of the employees 79 despite his having previously informed them
that he would agree to a consent election if they took such action. 0
The Board held that a bargaining order was an extraordinary remedy,
that a Board-conducted election was the preferred method of initiating
a bargaining obligation, and that a bargaining order was appropriately
issued only when it was the most effective method of effectuating
employee sentiment.8 ' The Board conceded the commission by the
employer of 8(a)(3) violations in refusing to reinstate strikers, but
concluded that he was motivated by a belief that Mr. Marsh was a
supervisor"' and had quit and that Mr. Alexander had engaged in un-
protected activity while on the picket line which permitted a discharge
75. 187 N.L.R.B. at 488, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1037.
76. 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1971).
77. The Trial Examiner later determined that one of the men, Mr. Shafer, was a
supervisor, but there is no evidence that he solicited the support of employees for the
union. The second man, Mr. Marsh, was found not to be a supervisor.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . to dominate or inter-
fere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contrib-
ute financial or other support to it ...
79. NLRB STATEmENT OF RuEs s AND REGurTIONS § 101.18.
80. 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 719, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305, 1307 (1971).
81. 190 N.L.R.B. at 719, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1307. The Board cited Gissel Packing
in support of its view that a bargaining order was appropriate where "the possibility of
erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun)
by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that employee sentiment
once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining
order." 190 N.L.R.B. at 719, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1307.
82. Although officers of the employer introduced Mr. Marsh to customers as super-
intendent of the employer's trust department, it does not appear that anyone in manage-
ment ever advised Mr. Marsh that he possessed any supervisory authority, or that he
ever exercised such authority.
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for cause. 3 Furthermore, the Board concluded that the impact of the
unfair labor practices might be substantially neutralized by resort to
remedies less severe than a bargaining order, namely, reinstatement,
backpay, and the posting of notices.84
The Board made an impressive attempt to distinguish its decision
from the Wilder I case85 by arguing that Wilder I involved not simply
the possession of independent knowledge, clearly present in the instant
decision because of the submission of cards by all of the employees in
the bargaining unit as well as the participation in a strike by nine of
the eleven individuals in the unit.80  Wilder 1 also involved an unwill-
ingness to resolve any lingering doubts of majority status through elec-
tion procedures. The Board then went on to note that the employer
and the union in the present case never entered any agreement to per-
mit majority status to be determined by means other than a Board elec-
tion."7
The illogic of the distinction is apparent. If an employer will not
be found to have violated 8(a) (5) by reneging on an agreement to
permit majority status to be determined within the Board's election
process, the Board appears to be overruling Wilder I since the employer
there made no agreement of any kind. Clearly the existence of a strike
supported by a majority cannot be controlling since this element exists
in both cases. The only other basis for distinction is the communication
in Wilder I by one officer of the corporation to other officers that the
union had majority support. Surely such a comment, particularly in
view of the absence of anything in the record as to the evidentiary basis
of the remark, ought to be insufficient to justify the issuance of a bar-
gaining order in Wilder I. Comparatively, the argument for the issu-
ance of a bargaining order in Summer & Co. is stronger than that in
Wilder I since in the former case the presentation of authorization
cards, petitions signed by the majority of the employees on two separate
occasions, and a strike in which nine of the eleven employees in the
bargaining unit participated would appear to establish independent
knowledge under the Wilder I test. Furthermore, the Board's some-
what dubious reliance in Summer & Co. on an erroneous belief that
83. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970) permits an employer to discharge an employee for
cause.
84. 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 719, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1307.
85. 185 N.L.R.B. 175, 75 L.R.R.M. 1023 (1970).
86. At the time the strike took place, Mr. Shafer had quit his job thus reducing the
size of the unit to eleven.
87. 190 N.L.R.B. at 721, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1309.
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supervisory personnel had influenced the employees would seem to be
a basis for an 8(a)(5) violation using the logic of H & W Construction
Co., Inc.88 which held that an employer could not assert, as a defense
to an 8(a)(5) charge, a contention that is unrelated to the majority
status of the union.
The failure of the Board in Summer & Co. to acknowledge that
the effect of its decision was to overrule Wilder I was corrected when
the Board later reconsidered Wilder. 9 The Board then lost little time
in noting that Wilder I was overruled,90 and that the independent
knowledge doctrine would, henceforth, be significantly narrowed. The
Board came to recognize that the doctrine possessed many of the weak-
nesses inherent in the "good faith doubt" test of Joy Silk. The Board
was troubled by the difficulty, potential for abuse, and lack of predicta-
bility that was unavoidable when an attempt was made to "divine" the
state of the employer's knowledge and intent at the time of his refusal
to bargain. 91
The Board focused on the subjective nature of the test devised
in Wilder I:
And if we are to let our decisions turn on an employer's "will-
ingness" to have majority status determined by an election,
how are we to judge "willingness" if the record is silent, as
in Wilder, or doubtful, as here, as to just how "willing" the
Respondent is in fact? We decline. . . to reenter the "good-
faith" thicket of Joy Silk, which we announced to the Supreme
Court in Gissel we had virtually abandoned . . . altogether.92
The Board, in an effort to limit the considerable discretion provided
under the Wilder I test to determine whether the facts presented give
rise to an inference that the employer had independent knowledge of
the union's majority, substituted a new test, namely, that the employer
is under no obligation to accept evidence of the union's majority status,
other than the results of an election, unless he has attempted to make
his own determination of the union's support by means other than a
Board election.93  It would appear, therefore, that the independent
knowledge test can still be utilized to reach him if he agrees to submit
88. 161 N.L.R.B. 852, 854-55, 63 L.R.R.M. 1346, 1347 (1966).
89. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972). The Board petitioned the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to remand Wilder for reconsideration in
light of its decision in Summer & Co. The motion was granted.
90. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1040 (1972).
91. Id.
92. Id.; see text accompanying note 66 supra.
93. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.RLR.M at 1040.
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authorization cards to an impartial third party for verification, or if he
unilaterally attempts to gauge union support by means of interrogation
or polling of employees. The Board, thus, set down a test which it
hopes will encourage the use of the election process since it most effec-
tively balances the interests Congress desired to promote, namely
implementation of an employee's section 7 rights, employer free
speech, and a flexible formula endowing the Board with the power it
needs to promote those interests while possessing sufficient specificity
so as to place interested parties on notice as to what is likely to be pro-
scribed conduct. 94
The Supreme Court in Gissel provided little assistance in determ-
ining the permissibility of the Board's new approach. The Court, for
the most part, limited its discussion to the appropriateness of the issu-
ance of a bargaining order where there is substantial and irreparable
interference with the election process. The Court recognized that re-
liance on authorization cards is, at times, unavoidable, but only where
unlawful employer conduct has disrupted the election process. 0 It
avoided consideration of the appropriateness of any such reliance
where no unfair labor practices have been committed. Its emphasis
on the superiority of the election process would seem to support the
assertion that the bargaining order is an extraordinary remedy, resorted
to only when no other remedy may adequately protect employee section
7 rights. The endemic weakness of the cards is not, in itself, sufficient
cause to ignore them, but rather ought to serve to stimulate the Board
to exercise greater care in minimizing the abusive utilization of the
cards. If the employer's conduct has frustrated the election process,
the rights of employees will unavoidably be affected regardless of
whether or not the bargaining order is issued.
When the preferred method of determining employee wishes
has been tampered with, it totally begs the question to say
that employee rights are sacrificed by a bargaining order.
Employee rights are affected whatever the result: If an in-
adequate rerun remedy is routinely applied, the rights of
94. "ITihe objectives of our statute are best served by encouraging the parties to
utilize our orderly election procedures to establish a reliable majority support foundation
for a bargaining relationship. In such cases, it seems far better not to enter the tangled
thicket of frequently unreliable evidence as to the subjective desires of employees with
respect to representation." Id.
95. 395 U.S. at 597-98, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2489 (1969). See also note 47 supra.
96. "Ihe acknowledged superiority of the election process, however, does not mean
that cards are thereby rendered totally invalid, for where the employer engages in con-
duct disruptive of the election process, cards may be the most effective-perhaps the
only-way of assuring employee choice." 395 U.S. at 602, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2491.
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those employees who desire collective bargaining, and whose
desires were met with violations of law, are not being pro-
tected; if a bargaining order is issued, the rights of those who
oppose collective bargaining are being tramped on if-and
I emphasize the "if"-a poll conducted after the effects of
earlier coercion were satisfactorily dissipated would indicate
a union loss. Thus it is impossible to defend a refusal to im-
pose a bargaining order unless one is willing to defend the
adequacy of the particular remedies in fact applied in con-
nection with the decision to direct a second election.17
The Board has all too casually issued bargaining orders in the past
without reference to whether less severe remedies might be devised
to neutralize unlawful employer conduct.98  Such an approach fails to
accord to the election process the "preferred" status both Congress and
the Supreme Court intended it to have.9 9 It may be argued with con-
siderable merit that there exists little or no empirical data that permits
the Board to conclude that a specific employer unfair labor practice can
be effectively neutralized by a given remedy. There exists even less
information on the effect of the mere passage of time on union support.
Perhaps the best known study yet conducted is that of Professor
Daniel Pollitt who examined 20,153 elections held between 1960 and
1962.10 Professor Pollitt found that the individual responsible for the
initial election being set aside won in more than two-thirds of the rerun
elections.' 01 The study also concluded that some unfair labor practices
were more effective than others in establishing a coercive atmosphere
in which a union victory was unlikely °.0 2 Finally, the study established
97. H. Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65
MICH. L. REv. 851, 862 (1967).
98. The variety of remedies is limited only by the scope of the Board's imagination
and the requirement that the remedy be remedial rather than penal in nature. Since
it is not difficult to establish a causal link between a Board devised remedy and the pro-
motion of an employee's section 7 rights, this limitation is not one especially difficult
to overcome. Illustrations of less severe remedies which may make unnecessary the issu-
ance of a bargaining order include requiring that an employer post notices on company
property denouncing its unfair labor practices, the issuance of cease and desist orders,
granting the union the right to use company bulletin boards for a specific period of
time, requiring the employer to mail notices to employees acknowledging his intent to
avoid interfering in their organizational campaign, requiring the employer or a represen-
tative of the NLRB to read aloud to employees on company time a statement repudiating
its unlawful conduct.
99. See text accompanying notes 7-20 supra; 395 U.S. at 599-604, 71 LR.R.M. at
2490-91 (1969).
100. D. Pollitt, NLRB Re-run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 309 (1963).
101. Id. at 212. During this period, 267 rerun elections were held and in only 31%
of them did the individual whose unlawful conduct was responsible for negating the re-
sults of the first election lose the rerun election.
102. Where a threat to close the plant was made if the union were elected, the union
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a connection between the impact of the lapse of time between the orig-
inal election and the rerun election and the likelihood of change in the
result.10 3
The Pollitt study, while admittedly useful, provides the Board with
a basis for making only the most general conclusions concerning the
most effective manner of dealing with a given unfair labor practice.
Furthermore, the study does not address itself to the effect of the lapse
of time on the results of an election in the absence of an unfair labor
practice. Thus it is impossible to thoroughly evaluate one of the most
frequently voiced arguments of the union, namely, that, even in the
absence of unfair labor practices, a requirement that the union, rather
than the employer, be expected to petition for a representation election
will inevitably result in delays that are sufficient to undermine its ma-
jority' 04 Board member Fanning in his dissent in Wilder II observed
that:
[O]ur experience in conducting elections demonstrates that
where employers are willing to go to an election, the election
is held more expeditiously and with far less likelihood of in-
terference in the conduct of the election than is the case
where either party has to be forced to an election. 10
The Court of Appeals in Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB0 0 resolved
the problem by reinstating the "willingness to resolve lingering doubts"
test of Wilder I and by requiring the employer to evidence such "will-
lost in 71% of the rerun elections; a promise of a wage increase or other benefit if the
union were defeated resulted in union defeat in 67% of reruns; surveillance resulted in
loss in 67% of reruns; a threat to discharge employees if they voted for the union re-
sulted in union loss in 63% of rerun elections; a threat to eliminate benefits or a refusal
to bargain with a union if elected resulted in union loss in 25% of reruns; interrogation
by supervisors resulted in loss of 50% of reruns; misrepresentation of material facts
resulted in union loss in 40% of rerun elections. See Pollitt, supra note 100, at 215.
103. A rerun election held within one month of the initial election or longer than
nine months afterward ended in a change in result in 21% and 22% respectively. An
election held between one and two months after initial election generated the greatest
change in result, 40%. Between two and three months, the figure drops to 32%, and
between three and six months drops to 26%. Pollitt, supra note 100, at 221.
104. See Brief for Respondents at 8-9, Linden Lumber, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 429, 87
L.R.R.M. 3236 (1974).
The median time in a contested election, in which a party has moved for a preelec-
tion hearing, between the filing of the petition for representation and the election is 60
to 63 days. In a consent election, in which the preelection hearing is waived, the usual
time between petition and election is twenty to twenty-three days.
105. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1043 (1972).
106. 487 F.2d 1099, 84 L.R.R.M. 2177 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Wilder 1H and Summer
& Co. were consolidated on appeal under this name. The case was decided by the Su-
preme Court under the name Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, - U.S.
-, 95 S. Ct. 429, 87 L.R.R.M. 3236 (1974).
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ingness" by either recognizing the union or petitioning for an elec-
tion.1 7  By requiring the employer to take this action, the election
process would be expedited by dispensing with the need for an initial
hearing, and thus would provide a substantial safeguard against the
delaying tactics of the employer. The requirement would also serve
to implant substantially greater predictability into the issuance of bar-
gaining orders by eliminating those elements of the independent knowl-
edge test that were subject to potential abuse. There would be no
further need to probe into the employer's psyche for the purpose of
determining whether there existed any genuine question of majority
status, nor would it be necessary to examine events, the impact of which
on the employer was equivocal at best, in order to create a fiction of
certainty as to the union's support. The proposed formula was sim-
plicity itself. In the absence of an unfair labor practice which made
the holding of a fair election improbable regardless of the imaginative-
ness of the remedy devised to neutralize the unlawful conduct-in
which case a bargaining order remained appropriate-the burden was
placed on the employer, when confronted with cards signed by a ma-
jority of the employees in the bargaining unit, to either recognize and
bargain with the union representative or resolve any doubts as to its
majority support by petitioning for an election.
The new approach did not appear, at first glance, to conflict with
the congressional intent as expressed in the Wagner Act and the Taft-
Hartley amendments. The legislative history of the relevant statutes 08
expressed a preference for the election process, a preference strongly
affirmed by the Supreme Court.0 9 The legislative history, however,
as has already been demonstrated, never intended the Board-conducted
election to be the only method of generating a bargaining obligation.
It might be argued that since the bargaining order may continue to be
appropriately issued in Gissel-type situations, the election is not the ex-
clusive method of initiating a bargaining relationship. But the legisla-
tive history of section 9(c)(1)(b), 1 0 which permits the employer to
107. "While we have indicated that cards alone, or recognitional strikes and ambigu-
ous utterances of the employer, do not necessarily provide such 'convincing evidence of
support,' so as to require a bargaining order, they certainly create a sufficient probability
of majority support as to require an employer asserting a doubt of majority status to
resolve the possibility through a petition for an election, if he is to avoid both any duty
to bargain and any inquiry into the actuality of his doubt." 487 F.2d at 1111, 84
L.R.R.M. at 2186.
108. See text accompanying notes 1-20 supra.
109. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 71 L.R.R.M. 2481 (1969).
110. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
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petition for an election when presented with a request to bargain, was
never intended to require the employer to so petition. The section was
aimed at remedying the discrimination which had existed against
employers under the Wagner Act, permitting them to petition for an
election only when confronted by demands for recognition from two or
more unions, while preventing an employer from petitioning for an
election during the early stages of the organizing campaign before a
union possessed an -adequate opportunity to secure majority support.
The principle which the court of appeals advocated in Truck Drivers
would substitute a new discriminatory treatment of the employer for
the one removed by Congress in 1947.
It can be argued in support of the union's position that the Truck
Drivers test more effectively promotes the objectives of the Labor-
Management Relations Act than does the Board's approach in Wilder
II. No significant burden is placed on the employer's right of free
speech under section 8(c)111 since the employer has a median time of
twenty to twenty-three days to communicate his position to his employ-
ees. One might also argue that the employer had an opportunity to
communicate his point of view, by deeds as well as words, long before
the union came onto the scene. If he did so in a convincing fashion
and addressed himself to the needs of his men, he has little to fear.
Furthermore, section 8(c) was not intended to insure a right of
rebuttal, but rather to prevent the Board from attributing an anti-union
motive to an employer on the basis of his past statements. Under the
Wagner Act, which contained section 8(a)(1) but not section 8(c),
the Board condemned almost any anti-union expression by an em-
ployer, insisting upon strict neutrality by the employer. The Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Virginia Electric and Power Co.11 2 expressed its dis-
approval of the Board approach when it held that the employer pos-
sessed a constitutional right to express opinions that were noncoercive
in nature. The Board's subsequent reluctance to fully implement the
ruling of the Court 1 constituted the background for section 8(c) of
111. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not consti-
tute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.
See also Linn v. Plant Guards Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 62 n.5, 61 L.R.R.M. 2345,
2348 n.5 (1966).
112. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
113. See Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 18 L.R.R.M. 1360 (1946).
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the Taft-Hartley Act." 4
Secondly, the section 7 fights of the employees are more likely
to be promoted by the adoption of the proposed test in that both sides
have adequate opportunity to communicate to the employees the wis-
dom of adopting their respective positions while minimizing the
potential for abuse that an unnecessary prolongation of the period
required to determine the existence of a bargaining obligation is likely
to generate. It is naive to expect an employer, who is unwilling to
accept any alternative for ascertaining the union's majority status other
than a union petition for an election, to make every effort to expedite
a Board election.
The Board's approach in Wilder II continues to make possible the
issuance of a bargaining order, admittedly under a narrowed construc-
tion of the independent knowledge doctrine, but nevertheless under-
mining the employer's right of free speech and maximizing reliance on
the use of authorization cards, strikes,115 polling, etc., for the purpose
of concluding that no real question of the union's majority status exists.
The approach proposed in Truck Drivers would appear to minimize
114. The Hartley bill as passed by the House provided that -[e]xpressing any views
or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic or visual
form, if it does not by its own terms threaten force or economic reprisal," shall not con-
stitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §
8(d) (1) (1947). The Senate version was broader in scope reading:
The Board shall not base any finding of unfair labor practice upon any state-
ment of views or arguments, either written or oral, if such statement contains
under all the circumstances no threat, express or implied, of reprisal or force,
or offer, express or implied, of benefit. Provided, That no language or provi-
sion of this section is intended to nor shall it be construed or administered so
as to abridge or interfere with the right of either employers or employees to
freedom of speech as guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 8(c) as passed by the Senate p. 84.
Senator Taft commented on the intent of the Conference Committee.
The conferees had in mind a number of Board decisions in which because of
the fact that an employer has at some time committed an unfair labor practice
a speech by him, innocuous in itself, has been held not to be privileged. The
conferees did not believe that past misconduct should deprive either employers
or labor organizations of the privilege of exercising constitutional rights.
There have also been a number of decisions by the Board in which discharges
of employees, even though there was no evidence in the surrounding circum-
stances of discrimination, have been deemed unfair labor practices because at
one time or another the employer has expressed himself as not in favor of
unionization of his employees. The object of this section, therefore, is to make
it clear that decisions of this sort cannot be made under the conference bill.
90 CoNG. Rtc. 7002 (1947).
115. The Supreme Court in Gissel acknowledged that a strike was a factor that might
be considered in determining majority support. A strike alone, however, is insufficient
to establish independent knowledge. The employer may reasonably regard individuals
who strike to be motivated as much by fear of physical intimidation and social ostracism
as by support for the union. See Linden Lumber, 95 S. Ct. 42% 432 (1974).
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reliance on authorization cards, merely utilizing them as a mechanism
to trigger the employer's obligation to petition for an election. The
proposed test would minimize the issuance of the bargaining order,
except in situations involving the commission of unfair labor practices
which render a fair election improbable, thus recognizing the bargain-
ing order as an extraordinary remedy with greater potential for frustrat-
ing the objectives of the Labor-Management Relations Act than any
requirement that an employer petition for an election.
If an employer is compelled to go to an election against his wishes,
it can be argued that the time saving advantage of the proposal is signif-
icantly reduced, since the employer, in the event of a union victory,
may refuse to bargain thus necessitiating the filing of an 8(a)(5)
charge against him." 6  If, however, an employer is adamant in his
determination to avoid bargaining with a union, it will make little differ-
ence who files a representation petition, since in either case the
employer always has available to him the alternative of refusing to file.
It is this very factor that justifies the retention of the bargaining order,
for there is no viable method of regulating an individual who demon-
strates his willingness to ignore cease and desist orders and risks the
contempt powers of the courts in order to destroy a union's support."1 7
Furthermore, if an 8(a)(5) hearing must be held, the issues for con-
sideration are considerably less complex than they would be using the
independent knowledge test, since it is limited to a determination of
the appropriateness of the bargaining unit and the existence of cards
signed by a majority of the employees in the unit. The deterrent effect
of the proposed rule is subject to question, since the employer may rely
on the considerable time necessary to process an unfair labor practice
charge to undermine union support even if he does not succeed in
winning at the hearing. But this same problem exists under the current
Board approach.
The Supreme Court in Linden Lumber argued that the time sav-
ing argument of the circuit court's proposal was illusory, since even if
required to petition for an election, the employer might select a
bargaining unit other than that sought by the union."8  This does
116. The median time in a contested case involving an unfair labor practice charge
is 388 days. See Linden Lumber, 95 S. CL 429, 432 (1974). Indeed, in Linden Lum-
ber, the time differential between the filing of the charge and the Board's ruling was
4% years, in Wilder, about 6Y years.
117. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 76 L.IR.M. 2817 (5th Cir. 1971).
118. NLRB: RuLEs & REGULATIONS § 102.62. When an employer petitions for an
election, he is required to define the appropriate unit and therefore would not be entitled,
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not necessarily mean he would be acting in bad faith in an attempt to
delay further proceedings. There might be legitimate differences of
opinion as to which unit is appropriate. The union could waive the
hearing by not raising any objections at that point, but in doing so, it
would have to accept the employer's determination of the bargaining
unit. If the union refused to accept the employer's determination, a
hearing would be held, with the subsequent loss of much of the time
advantage the requirement of an employer petition was to provide.
Admittedly the time lapse would not be as great as a union petition
would entail, since in the former situation, the union could minimize
its challenges, whereas in the latter case, the employer might attempt
to make as many challenges and seek as many postponements as pos-
sible.
Furthermore, the employer must be provided with a reasonable
period of time in which to file his petition. The opportunity to delay
here can be remedied by the Board using its rule making authority to
designate what constitutes a reasonable time. Nevertheless, another
segment of the time advantage would be removed. Consequently, the
time saving envisioned by the circuit court would occur only when the
union would be willing to resolve in the employer's favor questions
relating to whether given individuals or job classifications fall within a
bargaining unit. 119 Thus, a requirement that an employer petition for
an election still does not preclude delay if the employer is sophisticated
enough to draft his petition so as to elicit objections from the union.120
The proposal in Truck Drivers clearly possesses considerable
merit-simplicity, predictability, reduction of the opportunity for an
abusive exercise of discretion by the Board, the promotion of an em-
ployee's section 7 rights, adequate opportunity for communications of
as an objecting party, to request a hearing or to object to a sufficient showing of major-
ity support (30%).
119. 95 S. Ct. at 433-34. Section 9(c)(1)(B) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)
(B) (1970), states that an employer petition must allege that "one or more individuals
or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representa-
tive defined in section 9(a)." Since a question of representation is raised only by a
claim by a labor organization that it represents a majority of employees in an appropri-
ate unit, the Board will dismiss an employer's petition if there is a significant discrep-
ancy between the unit designated by the employer and that posited by the union. This
is likely to be a problem only where the employer designated unit is significantly larger
than the union designated unit.
120. Even if a union petitions for an election, although it must demonstrate a 30%
showing of interest from the employees, the sufficiency of the showing is not litigable
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each party's position. The fact that the employer feels that he suffers
inconvenience ought not, in itself, be controlling. Legislation inevita-
bly places limitations upon an individual's freedom of action. Such a
result is tolerated if greater interests are promoted.
There is considerable difficulty in ascertaining whether this test
is superior to that adopted by the Board in Wilder II and affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Linder Lumber. Both tests are premised on a
recognition of the preferred status of an election to determine the
degree of union support and the need to minimize any inquiry into an
employer's subjective motivation to assess the propriety of a bargaining
order. It was with this objective in mind that the Board in Wilder II
limited the issuance of a bargaining order to those cases where either
unlawful conduct had taken place making improbable the holding of
a fair election or where the employer attempted 'to determine majority
status by a means other than an election.
The Wilder test, however, despite its substantial narrowing of the
independent knowledge doctrine still involves the Board in a determi-
nation of employer intent. Although the Board in Wilder referred only
to cases dealing with reneging on an agreement to submit authorization
cards to 'a third party' 21 and a case involving the polling of employees
by the employer,' 22 the language of the opinion would permit the Board
to go beyond those fact patterns to focus on whether the employer
engaged in any activity designed to determine the degree of union sup-
port.123
The tests set down in both Wilder II and Truck Drivers are steps
in the right direction. Wilder II, however, possesses the rather discon-
certing potential for reversion into the more unfortunate aspects of the
old independent knowledge doctrine. If an employer possesses any
sincere doubts concerning the union's majority, he can resolve those
doubts in an election, generally conceded to be the most accurate
method of gauging employee support. This election will be preceded
by a period of sufficient duration to permit the employer to communi-
cate his case to his employees. 2 4 The opportunity to delay the election
by utilizing Board procedures, while admittedly still present, is re-
duced.2 5 The ultimate resort to a refusal to bargain in the event of
121. Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709,49 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1961).
122. Nation-Wide Plastics Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 996, 81 L.R.R.M. 1036 (1972).
123. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1039-40.
124. See note 104 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 118-119 supra.
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a union victory is an ever present possibility regardless of the initiator
of the representation petition. But at the 8(a)(5) hearing the issues
will be relatively simple and easy to resolve, namely, the existence of
a card majority and the justifiable nature of the delay. The employer
retains the right to designate the bargaining unit,' 26 and if the union
is dissatisfied with his choice, any further delay will be its responsibility.
As to any waiver of a right to challenge the union showing of interest
(30%), this is not subject to questioning at this stage anyway.J27 The
purpose of the rule is not to permit the union the right to an election
when its bargaining position is strongest. It clearly possesses no such
right any more than it has the right to communicate, during the organi-
zation campaign, so as to maximize the impact of its statement.' 28 The
rule is designed to promote the objectives of the act, and it permits the
employer to adequately protect significant interests while maximizing
the right of the employees to have their sentiments effectively deter-
mined.
It may be argued that the view of the lower court enhances the
value of authorization cards as an accurate gauge of employee support
for the union by requiring the employer to accept the cards and immed-
iately agree to bargain or to regard the cards as sufficiently persuasive
to require him to go to an election. Heretofore, the employer would
simply refuse to acknowledge the validity of the cards, and in the
absence of the commission of unfair labor practices rendering a fair
election improbable, an agreement to permit a third party to resolve
the question of authenticity, or a unilateral effort to verify personally,
usually by polling, his refusal to bargain would not be subject to ques-
tion. The approach currently adopted by the Board in Wilder II and
approved by the Supreme Court in Linden Lumber continues to require
the Board to determine whether an employer's unfair labor practices
are so substantial that a fair election is impossible. Due to the lack
of empirical data on the effect of the commission of various types of
unfair labor practices on the employee, the difficulty in ascertaining the
appropriate timing of a rerun election , and the effectiveness of
remedies other than bargaining orders in dissipating employer conduct
126. If the employer's proposal for a unit is outrageous, the regional director could
suggest a change without conducting a hearing, or the union could disclaim any interest
in the unit.
127. See note 120 supra.
128. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Central Hardware Co. v.
NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 80 L.R.R.M. 2769 ,(1972); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S.
105, 38 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1956).
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which weakens a union majority, any system which minimizes reliance
on the weaknesses of the current procedure and substitutes the authori-
zation cards as a mechanism for triggering an obligation to petition for
an election would appear to be desirable. Such an approach reduces
much of the uncertainty concerning the desires of the employees and
the effect of employer conduct. The election which would follow would
provide the Board with a statistical base for evaluating the effect of
employer conduct on the election. It is incumbent upon the Board,
however, to conduct a systematic examination of the election process
so that it may more effectively devise remedies other than the bargain-
ing order wherever possible, thus reducing its reliance on a gut reaction
as to the effect of employer conduct. In the absence of such a study,
reliance upon what many regard to be the myth of Board expertise is
likely to generate greater disillusionment with the entire process, and
encourage the manipulation of the current procedures by both sides in
a manner that frustrates the objectives of the Act.
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